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Abstract
We show that banks significantly under-report the risk in their trading book when
they have lower equity capital. A decrease in a bank’s equity capital results in substan-
tially more frequent violations of its self-reported risk levels in the following quarter.
These results are consistent with the view that banks under-report their risks to lower
their current regulatory capital requirements at the expense of potentially higher future
capital requirements that follow if the under-reporting is detected. The under-reporting
is especially high during the critical periods of high systemic risk and for banks with
larger trading operations. Our results provide evidence that the current regulations
give reporting incentives that make the self-reported risk measures least informative
precisely when they matter the most.
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1 Introduction
Do banks accurately report their risks to outsiders? Accurate and timely measurement
of risk is crucial for assessing the soundness of financial institutions and the stability of
the financial system and economy as a whole. The complexity of a large bank’s business
model makes it difficult for regulators and market participants to observe the bank’s true
risks at a reasonable cost. As a result, outsiders depend on information from the bank itself
to judge its riskiness. These self-reported risk levels then heavily influence both regulatory
treatment of the banks and market participants’ investment decisions. Riskier banks face
higher capital charges, pay more for deposit insurance, and are more likely to face regulatory
sanctions. Such banks are also likely to face more risk in the stability of their funding during
periods of banking crisis. These consequences create an important incentive problem: the
under-reporting of risk by the banks. Do banks engage in such behavior? What are the
implications of this behavior on the usefulness of risk measurement for the financial system
as a whole, particularly in times of systemic stress? We empirically address these important
questions by examining the accuracy of self-reported risk measures in banks’ trading books.
While accurate risk reporting is important for the entire business of a bank, we focus
on the trading book because it allows us to tease out the under-reporting incentives in a
clean way. A typical trading portfolio consists of marketable financial instruments linked to
interest rates, exchange rates, commodities, and equity prices. The trading desks of large
financial institution have significant risks and have been the subject of many recent policy
debates and discussions on risk-management failures within a bank.1 Banks are allowed to
measure the risk of their trading portfolio with internal Value-at-Risk (VaR) models. Value-
at-Risk is a statistical measure of risk that estimates the dollar amount of potential losses
from adverse market moves. Regulators around the world use these numbers to determine
1See, for example, the enactment of “Volcker Rule,” (under Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act) which restricts the trading activity of depository institutions. Recent scandals
include “London Whale” Bruno Iksil at J.P. Morgan in 2012 and Kweku Adoboli at UBS in 2011. These
events cost their banks about $6.2 billion and $2.2 billion in trading losses, respectively.
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capital requirements for market risk. Institutions can lower their current capital requirements
by under-reporting their risks, and the incentive to do so is especially strong if they have
lower equity capital to begin with. The use of an internal risk model leaves a great deal
of discretion with the reporting institution. For example, institutions can vary assumptions
about correlations between asset classes or the length of the historical period used to estimate
asset volatilities to estimate their VaR. This flexibility gives banks a significant ability to
under-report their trading risks. The combination of incentive and ability to under-report
risk has the potential to compromise the integrity of the risk levels that banks report in their
trading portfolios, and this is the focus of our study.
While no prior academic work has empirically investigated this issue, regulators do rec-
ognize the possibility of under-reporting. To mitigate this incentive, the regulators use a
“backtesting” procedure to evaluate the accuracy of an institution’s self-reported VaR, and
impose a penalty on institutions with inaccurate models. As per the recommendations of
Basel committee, an institution’s market-risk capital requirement is set at three times its
99% VaR number over a 10-day horizon.2 However, if an institution breaches its self-reported
VaR level too often, it faces higher capital requirement in future periods. For example, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) examines the number of times a bank
breaches its self-reported VaR – which we refer to as exceptions or violations – every quar-
ter. If an institution has more than four exceptions during the trailing four quarters, its
capital requirement for the subsequent periods can increase to up to four-times their VaR
level.3 Thus, regulators impose higher capital charge on institutions that are more likely to
have under-reported, but these charges come with significant delay. Depending on the future
asset price movements, with some probability the under-reporting does not get detected even
2VaR is computed at a certain confidence interval for a fixed horizon of time. A 10-day 99% VaR estimates
the dollar amount of loss that the portfolio should not exceed more than 1% of time over the next 10 trading
days. See Jorion (2007) for a comprehensive treatment of VaR models.
3The multiplier ranges from 3.0 (four or fewer exceptions) to 4.0 (ten or greater exceptions). The purpose
of this increasing penalty is in “maintaining the appropriate structure of incentives applicable to the internal
models approach” and to “generally support the notion that nine exceptions is a more troubling result than
five exceptions” (BIS, 1996).
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in the long run, and the under-reporting institution never gets penalized for it. Even if the
bank does experience VaR exceptions, the time delay in detection and punishment may be
sufficient to allow the offending bank to raise capital at a time when market conditions are
more favorable. For example, consider a sharp increase in the true VaR in the fourth quarter
of 2008. Truthful reporting and its commensurate necessity to immediately raise capital
may have been more costly (from the individual bank’s perspective) than under-reporting
the risk, potentially experiencing VaR exceptions, and then raising capital in mid 2009. This
regulatory structure therefore leads to the fundamental tradeoff we examine in this paper: a
bank can under-report its risk to save capital today in exchange for the potential for a higher
capital charge in the future. In addition to regulatory forces, the under-reporting incentives
can also arise from a desire to understate risk measures to other market participants. For
example, a bank that is concerned about large outflows of liabilities can resort to the under-
reporting of risk to try to avoid such outflows. Again the basic tradeoff remains the same:
benefits from under-reporting risk in the short-run with potential costs in the long-run.
A bank’s incentive to under-report its VaR depends on a trade-off between the shadow
price of capital today versus the shadow price of capital in the future, which can be more
than a year away. All else equal, raising capital is more costly when a bank has a very low
capital base. In these cases, the trade-off is more likely to tilt the bank’s incentive in favor
of saving capital today at the expense of possibly a higher capital charge tomorrow. After
all, the bank’s capital position may improve in the intervening time, there may be a shift
in the supply of bank capital that lowers issuance costs, or prices may move in favorable
directions so that outsiders fail to detect the under-reporting. Overall, we argue that the
under-reporting incentives are likely to be stronger when the reporting institution has lower
equity capital as of the reporting date and also when raising external capital is costly.
We assemble a detailed quarterly data set of self-reported trading book VaR and number
of VaR exceptions for a sample of 18 very large financial institutions from the U.S., Europe,
and Canada from 2002-2012. These institutions cover a significant fraction of the global
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banking assets. An exception occurs when a bank’s actual trading loss exceeds its self-
reported VaR. Our first contribution is descriptive in nature. We provide detailed summary
statistics on exceptions across banks and over time. Our main tests focus on commercial
banks reporting at the 99% confidence level. We find average quarterly exceptions of 0.62
for the entire sample, which is approximately equal to the statistical benchmark for a 99%
VaR model over roughly 63 trading days in a quarter. The average, however, masks an
important time-series variation. The average exceptions per quarter is below the statistical
benchmark during 2002-2006 at 0.08 per bank-quarter, and increases considerably thereafter.
During 2007-2009, we find average exceptions per bank-quarter of 1.64 which is almost three-
times higher than the statistical benchmark. We carefully examine the cross-sectional and
time-series variations in VaR exceptions in the paper.
In our main empirical test, we show that banks are significantly more likely to violate their
self-reported VaR levels (i.e., have more exceptions) when they have lower equity capital.
Our estimates show that one standard deviation decrease in a bank’s equity capital results in
an increase of 1.25 exceptions in the following quarter, which is a roughly twice the sample
average of 0.62 exceptions per quarter. Put differently, banks’ future losses exceed their own
risk assessment significantly more frequently when they have lower levels of capital relative
to when they have higher equity capital levels. Our empirical design is powerful because
exceptions occur when the losses exceed the bank’s self-reported level of VaR, not simply
when the level of VaR is high. Regardless of a given bank’s level of equity capital or riskiness,
the expectation of VaR exceptions should be identical: 1 in 100 trading days. Therefore,
we do not suffer from any biases due to the endogenous determination of equity capital and
the level of risk assumed by the bank. We also include both bank and year-quarter fixed
effects in our empirical models. Because VaR models use inputs based on historical volatility
of underlying risk factors such as interest rates and equity prices, unexpected increases in
these volatilities can result in higher violation frequency for all institutions. The inclusion
of year-quarter fixed effects in our model separates out the effect of time-specific changes in
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violation frequency. The inclusion of bank fixed effects ensure that we separate out the effect
of time-invariant differences in banks’ risk culture, quality of their VaR model, or level of
equity capital. Our design, therefore, relates within-bank variation in the level of its equity
capital and VaR exception frequency to identify banks’ under-reporting of trading-book risk.
In our next set of tests we exploit variations within the set of low equity capital banks.
We show that the relationship between equity capital and VaR exception is stronger when
banks have recently experienced lower stock returns. For such banks raising external equity
capital is even harder, and thus the incentives to under-report risk even stronger. Second,
we show that the effect is stronger when the trading business represents a relatively larger
portion of the bank’s business. For such banks, under-reporting can be economically more
beneficial and our results confirm that. Overall, our results show that banks’ response to
under-reporting incentives is strong when they stand to benefit more from it.
While it is important to understand the risk reporting dynamics of a given bank over
time, from a systemic perspective, it is even more important to understand how institutions
report their risk when the entire financial sector is under stress. These are the periods
when the shadow cost of capital is likely to be high for all institutions. If many institutions
under-report to save capital at such a time, the risk measure becomes least informative
during periods when the accuracy of risk measurement is crucial for assessing systemic risks
and designing policies to respond the stress on the financial system. Said differently, the
individual institution’s private marginal benefit of saving capital ex ante is likely to be
higher precisely when the social cost of bank failure is high.
We show that the relationship between equity capital and under-reporting is stronger dur-
ing periods of systemic stress. We use two measures of systemic risk in our main tests. First,
we show that the relationship between lower equity capital and subsequent VaR exceptions
is significantly amplified just after the failure of Lehman Brothers – a period characterized
by significant stress in the market. Second, we consider the Marginal Expected Shortfall
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(MES) of the banking sector as a whole, provided by the NYU Stern V-Lab, as a measure of
systemic stress in the economy (see Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010)).4
We show that our results are stronger when MES is higher, and they are particularly con-
centrated within periods when MES is in it the top quartile for the sample period. Our
results, therefore, show that lower equity capital banks are more likely to under-report when
the entire banking sector is in stress above and beyond their under-reporting during normal
times. This systematic under-reporting when the entire system is under stress renders such
risk measures least informative in periods when understanding financial sector risk is likely
to be most important.
Overall our results establish a link between equity capital and the accuracy of risk mea-
sures reported by banks. An alternative explanation is that the documented under-reporting
is simply due to poor-quality risk models of the bank. To be precise, as the economy transi-
tions from a relatively quiet to a high volatility period, there may be more VaR exceptions
due to an increase in realized volatilities as compared to predicted volatilities. Some banks
may be slow in updating their models – though regulations require periodic updating and
constant monitoring of VaR models – and hence they have more exceptions because of a
“stale model.” Note that in all our estimations, we separate out the effects of aggregate
changes in volatilities using the year-quarter fixed effects. For the “stale model” explanation
to hold, it must be the case that VaR models are more outdated only when bank enters a
low-capital quarter. Since we use bank fixed effects in all our estimations, any difference in
bank-specific modelling skill is unlikely to drive our results. Thus, it is unlikely that our
results are driven by this alternative. As a robustness test, we exclude year 2007 from our
sample and re-estimate the model. The key idea behind the test is to leave out the transition
period from a low volatility to high volatility regime in our sample. Even after excluding
this year, we find that VaR exceptions are significantly driven by low equity capital banks.
In an additional test, we exploit the dynamics of exceptions to further rule out this alterna-
4See http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/ for further details and documentation.
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tive. We consider the previous quarter’s exceptions as a proxy for the quality of the bank’s
VaR model, and re-estimate our main specification including the lagged exceptions as an
explanatory variable. Our results continue to hold. These pieces of evidence point towards
decisions that are motivated by capital saving concerns and not an outdated model.
We next shed some light on a possible mechanism through which banks could be under-
reporting their risk. Banks have a great deal of discretion in their modeling choices on a
variety of dimension. Discretion, when properly used, should improve the quality of the
reported levels of risk exposures. On the other hand, if discretion is used to under-estimate
risk exposure, then this should lead to a greater number of VaR exceptions. We estimate
the relationship between past stock market volatility and the reported level of VaR. Ceteris
paribus, the higher the volatility of the risk factor, the higher the level of VaR. We find that
the relationship between past market volatility and reported VaR to be weaker when banks
have lower equity capital, suggesting that banks use more discretion when they have low
equity capital. Combined with the main results above, this suggests that firms may be using
their discretion on volatility parameters to under-report their risk.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we connect to research work
in VaR models. Jorion (2002) analyzes the informativeness of VaR disclosures, and shows
that VaR numbers predict future trading losses at a bank. Basak and Shapiro (2001) and
Cuoco and Liu (2006) analyze VaR-based constraints and capital requirements, and theoret-
ically analyze the optimality of this mechanism. Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) analyze the
accuracy of VaR model as compared to various statistical benchmarks using a sample of six
banks from 1998-2000. Our paper is the first one to empirically examine the incentive effect
of VaR-based capital requirements. Second, our work is also related to a growing literature
on how risk-based capital requirements can alter the risk-taking behavior of banks (e.g.,
see Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013). Unlike this literature, our focus is on the incen-
tive to under-report risk rather than on the level or composition of risk assumed by banks.
Third, our work is related to the literature on the economics of self-reporting behavior and
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probabilistic punishment mechanisms (e.g., Becker, 1968). Kaplow and Shavell (1994) show
that self-reporting followed by a probabilistic audit and punishment for violation can be an
optimal mechanism in several settings. Such mechanisms saves on costly monitoring, while
maintaining the incentive to report truthfully. Our results highlight a potential shortcoming
of such a rule in the context of risk-based capital requirement. There is a fundamental dif-
ference between these models and our setting. These models do not consider the differences
in the shadow price of capital at the time the reporting compared to the time of (potential)
punishment. Our work shows that in such settings, the probabilistic punishment mechanism
based on the violations of self-reported risk may not work effectively if they ignore state
prices, and may have systemic consequences. Finally, our work is related to ongoing policy
discussions and research work on capital regulations and risk-taking behavior in the financial
sector (e.g., see Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2011), Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2009), and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008)). Recent work by Behn, Haselmann, and
Vig (2014) examines German banks around the introduction of Basel II, and provides evi-
dence that suggests that model-based regulations were not effective in tying capital charges
to the true level of loan credit risk in the banking book. They find that banks’ internal
model-based risk estimates systematically underestimated the level of credit risk in banks’
loan portfolios. Their evidence on the banking book is consistent with this paper’s evidence
on the trading book that the effectiveness of any new policy proposal on capital requirements
or risk measurement crucially depends on the quality of risk disclosure by the banks.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present our hypothesis and research
design, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypothesis and Research Design
VaR is a statistical measure of risk that estimates the dollar amount of potential loss from
adverse market moves (see Jorion (2007) for a comprehensive treatment of VaR models).
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These losses are measured over a fixed time-horizon of typically one or ten trading days and
at a given confidence interval. For example, a 99% confidence interval VaR of $100 million for
a 10-day holding period for a portfolio means that over the next 10 days, this portfolio’s loss is
expected to stay below $100 million with 99% probability. Due to pure statistical chance, we
would expect to see one exception (i.e., losses exceeding $100 million) every 100 trading days.
Absent any incentive conflicts, we should find no correlation between the frequency of VaR
exceptions and the institution’s incentive to save capital. As the riskiness of the underlying
assets increase (e.g., increases in exchange rate volatility), the level of VaR should rise, but
not the frequency of exceptions.5 This key distinction highlights the strength of our empirical
setting. Alternatively, if incentives play an important role in a bank’s reported level of VaR,
then a bank’s incentive to save capital should positively predict its VaR exceptions over
and above the random statistical benchmark. Additionally, the strength of this relationship
should rise with increases in incentives to save capital such as, for example, during periods
of significant frictions in raising capital by the bank or scarcity of capital in the economy as
a whole.
VaR estimates depend heavily on the underlying assumptions about the volatilities and
covariances of the underlying assets. To develop the intuition behind our empirical test,
consider the VaR of a unit of risky asset. Reportedit is the reported VaR of this asset by
bank i at the beginning of period t, whereas the true VaR of the asset is Actualit. Assume
that σpredicted is the volatility estimate used by the financial institution in estimating its
reported VaR. Financial institutions typically use the underlying asset’s historical volatility
estimated with past one to three years of data to estimate these numbers.6 Further assume
5Financial institutions develop their own internal model for VaR based on one of these three approaches:
(a) variance-covariance method, (b) historical simulation, or (c) Monte Carlo simulation. Although these
approaches differ in their implementation approach, they all rely on historical volatility of the assets, and
covariances across asset class to estimate the potential loss of the portfolio.
6For example, Bank of America state in their 2008 10-K, “Our VaR model uses a historical simulation
approach based on three years of historical data and assumes a 99 percent confidence level. Statistically,
this means that the losses will exceed VaR, on average, one out of 100 trading days, or two to three times
each year.”
9
that the realized volatility of the asset is denoted by σrealized. We can express the reported
VaR as a function G of risk (σpredicted) at a confidence interval (α) and residual (ηit) as
follows:
Reportedit = G(α, σpredicted)− ηit
ηit = φ(Incentivesit) + uit
For example, for a normally distributed asset, G(α, σpredicted) = α×σpredicted. However, we do
not rely on normality assumption for developing our empirical model. The key term in the
equation is the residual term ηit. In our model, this measure of under-reporting is driven by
incentive effects and the other a pure noise (uit). Our goal is to identify the incentive effects
in VaR reporting. The difference between the actual and reported VaR can be represented
as:
Actualit −Reportedit = {G(α, σtrue)−G(α, σpredicted)}+ φ(Incentivesit) + uit
This difference is decomposed into three parts: (a) a part that is driven by the difference in
realized and actual volatility estimates and the confidence interval of VaR, (b) a part driven
by the incentive effects, and (c) a pure noise term. Absent incentive effects, the difference
should be driven by factors that affect {G(α, σrealized)−G(α, σpredicted)} and pure statistical
chance uit. Since we consider VaR reported at 99% confidence interval for all banks in our
sample, the first part is essentially driven by the difference in {G(σrealized) − G(σpredicted)}
which is determined by the changes in volatility of the underlying assets. For our empirical
work, we observe the frequency of VaR exceptions as a proxy for Actualit − Reportedit and
we include year-quarter fixed effects in the empirical model to isolate the effect the economy-
wide risk factors which drive {G(σrealized)−G(σpredicted)}. Thus, our empirical model can be
represented as below:
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Exceptionsi,t+1 = β(Equityit) + λi + δt + ΓXit + it (1)
Exceptionsi,t+1 measures bank i’s VaR exception frequency at the 99% confidence interval
during quarter t to t+ 1. Equityit is the bank’s book equity capital ratio at the beginning of
the quarter and is a measure of the incentive to save capital during the quarter, thus βˆ is the
key estimate of interest in this model. Bank fixed effects (λi) control for the time-invariant
unobserved difference between banks. Differences in risk-management skills, organizational
structure and the importance of risk controls within the firm can have significant influence
on the level of risk-taking by banks (see Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)). Kashyap et al. (2008)
discuss the effects of internal controls and traders’ incentives on risk-taking behavior. These
differences can potentially impact the accuracy of the risk models themselves. The use of
bank fixed-effects allow us to separate out the effect of any time-invariant bank-specific skills
in modeling VaR (for example, G in our equation above) or the overall risk culture. Xit is
a vector of control variables including the size and profitability of the institution. In sum,
this model allows us to cleanly relate within-bank variation in equity capital ratios to VaR
exception frequency.
In the base case, we estimate the above model using OLS. This framework allows us to
consistently estimate the fixed-effect specifications. Since Exceptionsi,t+1 is a count variable,
bounded below by zero, in alternative specifications we also estimate our model using poisson
and negative binomial regression. As we show later in the paper, our results do not vary
with these modelling choices.
Our baseline tests shed light on a bank’s incentive in isolation. It is important to un-
derstand the informativeness of a bank’s risk measures because its failure can have severe
negative consequences for the real economy (e.g., see Khwaja and Mian (2008), Chava and
Purnanandam (2011), Schnabl (2012)). These costs are likely to be greater when the entire
banking system in under stress. During these periods, the stability of the entire system
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depends crucially on a proper assessment of the banks’ risk exposure. Policy responses such
as requiring additional capital to be raised or increased monitoring of institutions by the reg-
ulators, in turn, depend on the accuracy of risk measures. These are also times when capital
is likely to be most scarce and thus costly to raise. As a result, the incentive to under-
report and save on capital requirements is likely to be high during these periods. With this
in mind, we design our next test to investigate whether banks’ under-reporting behavior is
stronger during periods of financial sector stress. We estimate the following empirical model
to estimate this effect:
Exceptionsi,t+1 = φ(Equityit) + θ(System Stresst) + ρ(Equityit × System Stresst)
+ lambdai + δt + ΓXit + it (2)
System Stress is a measure of systemic stress in the economy. We interact this variable
with Equity to estimate the effect of equity capital on under-reporting behavior during such
periods. The parameter estimate ρˆ represents the effect of Equity during periods of financial
system stress beyond its effect in normal times (φˆ), and beyond the level effect on VaR
exceptions for all banks during that time period (θˆ). To empirically implement (2), we use
two measures of System Stresst: an indicator variable for the quarter immediately after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers (2008q4) and the total marginal expected shortfall (MES) for
the banking sector. Marginal Expected Shortfall measures expected capital shortfall faced
by a firm in a potential future financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2010). We use the MES for the
aggregate banking sector in our empirical tests which provides a good proxy for economic
construct we have in mind for our study.
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3 Data and Sample
We construct a sample of large financial institutions from U.S., Canada, and Europe
that provide sufficient details in their quarterly filings about the extent of VaR during the
quarter, and the number of exceptions over the same period. We collect quarterly data
on aggregate VaR of the bank as well as the corresponding number across risk categories
such as interest rates, and foreign exchange. Banks typically break down their overall VaR
across these categories: interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodities, and others. In
addition, often they provide the diversification benefit claimed across the asset classes. The
total VaR is the sum of VaRs across all categories net of the diversification benefit. As
mentioned earlier, banks are required to report their back-testing results to the regulators
based on a quarterly basis. When losses exceed the self-reported VaR, an exception occurs.
We collect all exceptions during the quarter for each bank, and use it as the key measure of
reporting accuracy.
We create two samples for our analysis. Our “base” sample includes only the top com-
mercial banks of these countries that report their VaR at the 99% confidence level, and
these observations are the subject of the bulk of our analysis. Our “expanded” sample adds
broker-dealers and observations where VaR is reported at 95%. We do not include these
observations in our base sample because it is not generally meaningful to compare the fre-
quency of VaR exceptions across different confidence intervals. In addition to the consistency
in reporting, commercial banks are also homogenous in terms of their capital requirements.
However, we conduct our main tests on the expanded sample that includes VaR exceptions
at the 95% level as well as VaR exceptions from broker-dealers. Broker-dealers also face
capital requirements for market risks based on similar Basel Committee formula.7 Our key
results are not sensitive to this sampling choice. Finally, we miss some large financial in-
7Broker-dealer’s net capital requirement is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
SEC’s formula for computing capital requirement for market risk is identical to the formula used by other
banking regulators for commercial banks (SEC, 2004).
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stitutions altogether from our sample because they do not disclose their VaR exceptions in
their quarterly filings at the 95% or 99% level. Our sample period begins in 2002 since the
required data on VaR is not available for most banks before this year and concludes in 2012
and it contains 15 commercial banks and 3 broker-dealers.
In total, we cover 18 of the largest financial institutions of the world and thus covers a
large portion of assets in the global banking system. Even more important, these institutions
cover a disproportionately large fraction of trading assets of the economy. Commercial banks
in our sample have about $14 trillion in assets. This compares well with the aggregate asset
base of about $13-14 trillion for U.S. commercial banks, and about AC30 trillion for banks
covered by the ECB as of 2013.
We also collect data on some measures of systemic stress. Our key measure of systemic
stress is the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of the banking sector, provided by the New
York University’s Volatility Lab (see Acharya et al. (2010)). We obtain this measure for all
systemically important financial institutions of the world on a quarterly basis, and aggregate
them to construct the systemic MES measure. The MES measure varies considerably over
time, providing us with reasonable time-series variation in the extent of capital shortfall in
the economy. We also use the Financial Stress Index (FSI) developed by the Federal Reserve
Banks of Cleveland, Kansas City, and St. Louis as additional measures of systemic stress in
the banking sector.8
Finally, we collect balance sheet data on bank’s equity capital, profitability, and asset base
on a quarterly basis from the bank’s quarterly filings and Bankscope. We also obtain their
stock returns from CRSP and Datastream. Data on interest rate, foreign currency, equity,
and commodity volatility come from the Federal Reserve Bank, CRSP, and Bloomberg. Our
base sample of commercial banks provides of 424 bank-quarter observations over 2002-2012
for our main tests. The expanded sample contains 545 bank-quarter observations that we
8These data are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED Economic Database under
the data series names CFSI, KCFSI, and STLFSI.
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examine in robustness tests.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the base sample. The sample banks have an
average asset base of $901 billion. On average, they are profitable during our sample period,
with a mean quarterly net-income-to-assets ratio of 0.17%. On average banks have 6.32%
equity as a percentage of their asset base. This ranges from 4.06% for the 25th percentile bank
to 9.01% for the 75th percentile. Most of our main tests will focus on the log of this ratio,
which emphasizes the idea that the strength of incentives increase at an increasing rate as
capital levels get lower. We use the book equity capital ratio instead of the regulatory capital
ratio as the key variable for our tests to avoid measurement error problems. Regulatory
capital ratios, such as the risk-weighted Tier-1 capital ratio, use the computed risk-weighted
assets of the bank in the denominator. The VaR of the trading book is an important variable
in the computation of the ratio, which introduces measurement issues. The use of book equity
capital ratio avoids such a problem.
Turning to the VaR data, we find that there is wide variation in VaR exceptions, the
level of VaR, and the composition of VaR. On average, a large proportion of trading asset
risk is related to interest rate risk, as VaR linked to interest rate represents about 57%
of the total VaR of the median bank. They also have considerable exposure to foreign
exchange, equities, and commodities risk. Overall, the pooled-sample statistics indicate that
the sample comprises very large banks with a wide variation in equity capital, trading desk
risk exposure, and VaR exceptions.
Table 2 provides a list of the financial institutions that enter our sample along with some
key descriptive statistics for each. It is clear that there is a large cross-sectional variation in
the level of VaR as well as exceptions across banks. Table 2 also highlights the substantial
within-bank variation of VaR levels and exceptions which we exploit in our main tests.
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4 Results
We first present some descriptive statistics on aggregate VaR and overall exceptions in
our sample. Following the research design discussed in Section 2, we next use regression
analysis to examine the relationship between equity capital and VaR exception in the base
sample. We then focus on periods when the financial system is under stress and where the
incentives to save capital are particularly strong.
4.1 Value-at-Risk Exceptions Over Time
Table 1 presents summary statistics on VaR exception for the sample. Since the VaR
numbers that we consider in the base sample are based on 99% confidence interval, we expect
to see 1 exception in every 100 days purely by chance. Hence on a quarterly basis, we expect
to observe an average of about 0.63 exceptions assuming 63 trading days in a quarter. Across
banks and quarters, the average quarterly exceptions (Exceptions) is 0.62 for the base sample
which is in line with the statistical expectation. Ranging from 0 to 13, there is substantial
variation in the number of exceptions which is present both in the cross-section and the
time-series.
Table 2 shows the variation in exception frequency across banks, while Figure 1 presents
this variation over time by plotting the average number of exceptions during each quarter in
the sample. Average VaR exceptions are well below their statistical expectation during 2002-
2006 at 0.08 per bank-quarter, but starting in 2007 the exceptions increase by a considerable
amount. The spike in these exceptions coincide with a period of increased systemic risk in
the economy of 2007-2009, where there are 1.64 per bank-quarter. From 2010-2012, we once
again observe fewer VaR exceptions with an average of 0.18 per bank-quarter. This figure
provides a clear insight: on average, the VaR models failed during periods of high systemic
risk when timely and accurate risk measurement in the financial sector is most important.
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During these periods, the exceptions are far greater than what reliable risk-measurement
reporting would predict. While this point has been argued by various market observers, our
paper provides first systematic assessment of this issue.
Figure 2 presents the actual distribution of quarterly VaR exceptions along with the
expected VaR exception frequency as computed using a binomial distribution. The figure
shows that there are far more quarters with zero observations than the binomial distribution
would predict, which could be an indication of conservatism in reporting during the early
portion of the sample period mentioned above. The figure also illustrates the “fat tail” of the
realized distribution – there are considerably more bank-quarter observations with a high
number of VaR exceptions than predicted by the binomial distribution.
4.2 Value-at-Risk Exceptions and Equity Capital
We begin the regression analysis by estimating our base Model (1) relating equity cap-
ital levels to VaR exceptions. Table 3 presents the results along with several alternative
specifications of the model that differ in terms of control variables used and estimation ap-
proach. Column (1) reports the effect of equity capital as measured by log(Equity/Assets)
on exceptions without any control variables other than bank and year-quarter fixed effects.
The log-transform of equity ratio assigns more weight on variation in equity capital at lower
values. This is consistent with our key economic argument that incentives to under-report
is higher when banks have lower levels of equity.9
We find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the equity capital ratio: when
banks have lower equity capital, they have more exceptions. In terms of economic magni-
tude, one standard deviation decrease in equity capital results in approximately 1.25 more
violations in the following quarter. With a sample average of 0.60, this is an economically
significant increase to roughly three times the average VaR exception frequency. In columns
9We estimate our model with equity-to-asset ratio as well as other natural concave transformations of the
ratio such as the square root and cubic root of equity ratio. We discuss them later in the paper.
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(2) and (3), we include controls for the effect of bank size and profitability, respectively. Our
main result are virtually unaffected, both statistically and economically. In column (4), we
explicitly include measures of the volatility of underlying risk factors during the quarter in
the regression model and drop year-quarter fixed effect in the model. As expected, we find
higher exceptions during quarter with high volatility in market returns, interest rates, and
commodity prices. Our main result relating equity capital to exceptions remains unchanged.
The reporting quarter for all banks in our sample are not exactly the same. For example,
some banks end their quarter in March, while others in April. Therefore, the volatility
measure computed during the quarter is not perfectly collinear with year-quarter fixed effects,
and we can include year-quarter fixed effects in the model along with the volatility measures.
Column (5) presents results based on this full specification. We cluster our standard errors
in our main specifications at the year-quarter level. In column (6), we compute standard
errors clustered at the bank level and find that the results are statistically significant at
the 3%. Since we need a large number of clusters to ensure consistent estimates and bank
clustering yields only 15 clusters, we focus on the estimates with year-quarter clustering.
Overall, Table 3 documents a strong effect of equity capital on the accuracy of self-reported
VaR measures.
In unreported tests, we estimate the model with various other measures of equity capital
ratio. We find a coefficient of -0.14 (p-value of 0.13) for the model that uses Eq/TA as the
key explanatory variable. The coefficient is larger for the model that uses square root of
Eq/TA (-1.34 with p-value of 0.01) and even larger for the model that uses cubic root of
Eq/TA as the explanatory variable (-3.25 with p-value of 0.01). Overall, these results paint
a clear picture. Banks with lower equity capital are more likely to under-report their risks,
and the under-reporting mainly comes when banks have very low equity capital.
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4.3 Further Variation in the Economics Benefits of Under-Reporting
Is the effect of equity capital on under-reporting higher when banks are likely to obtain
larger benefits from doing so? We turn to this question in our next set of tests. We exploit
variations along two important dimensions: (a) when the firm has recently experienced poor
stock returns, and (b) when trading represents a larger fraction of the bank’s business. First,
we consider the effect of a bank’s recent stock market return on the exception frequency.
Our tests so far are based on book equity capital. The incentive to save equity capital by
under-reporting is likely to be high after a decline in stock prices (i.e., market equity). In
these quarters, banks are likely to have relatively higher reluctance and reduced ability to
raise external equity capital. Based on this idea, we include the bank’s equity capital, prior
quarter’s stock return, and the interaction of these terms in the regression model. Table
4 presents the results, with the baseline full specification reproduced in column (1). For
easier economic interpretation, we divided all observations into two groups based on their
prior quarter’s stock returns. LowRet equals one for firms that fall in the bottom quartile
on this dimension(less than -6%). Column (2) shows that banks with lower equity return
have more frequent exceptions. Without the interaction effect, we find that banks with
lower equity capital as well as banks with poor stock returns have more exceptions, though
the estimate on LowRet is statistically insignificant with p-value of 0.11. However, column
(4) includes the interactive effect and reveals that when banks have lower equity capital,
they have significantly higher violations (a coefficient estimate of -1.59 on log(Eq/AT)),
but the effect is considerably stronger when the banks also have experienced lower stock
returns (a coefficient estimate of -1.48 on the interaction term). In economic terms, a low-
equity-capital bank with lower recent stock returns has twice as many VaR exceptions as a
low-equity-capital bank with higher recent stock returns.
Next, we exploit the cross-sectional variation in the importance of trading business to
a bank’s overall value. For this test, we first compute the ratio of self-reported VaR to
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equity capital ratio as of 2006Q1 (called VE 2006). We take this ratio as a proxy for the
importance of trading business for the bank. We compute this measure based on exposure in
the beginning of 2006 to ensure that our measure is not affected by post-crisis changes in risk-
taking behavior or equity capital. Using this variable, we estimate our model with data from
2006-2012 period. The key idea behind our test is to examine whether the effect of under-
reporting during and in the aftermath of the crisis is larger for banks with larger trading
business just before the crisis. We include the bank’s equity capital, and its interaction with
the trading exposure (i.e., VE 2006) in the main regression model.10 Table 5 presents the
results. We find that our main effects are concentrated within banks with larger trading
exposure: the coefficient on VE 2006 × log(Eq/AT) is approximately 50% larger than the
corresponding coefficient for the entire sample. In an alternative specification, we use an
indicator variable High(VE 2006) that equals one for banks that have above-median trading
exposure (VE 2006), and zero otherwise. As shown in Columns (4) and (5) the effect of
equity capital on exceptions for high trading exposure banks is almost twice as large as the
base case. In other words, the effect of equity capital on under-reporting is higher when
banks have more to gain in economic terms. Overall, these results are consistent with the
idea that banks are more likely to under-report when they have stronger incentives to save
on equity capital.
4.4 Systemic Stress
The next tests examine the effect of equity capital on exceptions during periods of sys-
temic stress. These periods are important for at least two reasons. First, they provide us a
source of time-series variation in the banks’ incentive to save capital. In such periods, banks
face tremendous costs in raising external capital. In extreme cases, the sources of external
equity capital can completely dry up during these periods. Second, these are the periods
10In this specification, we are unable to estimate the independent effect of the level of trading exposure
on under-reporting since it is subsumed by the bank fixed effects.
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when an accurate assessment of risk is vital for designing policies aimed at systemic stability.
We estimate model (2) using two different proxies of systemic stress: (a) an indicator variable
based on the quarter of Lehman’s failure, and (b) a variable based on Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES) in the capital of entire banking sector. Lehman Brothers failed on Septem-
ber 15, 2008. Subsequently, the entire world economy experienced a significant increase in
systemic risk due to concerns about counterparty and other risk factors in the banking sec-
tor. We create an indicator variable that equals one for the fourth quarter of 2008, and zero
otherwise, to capture the effect of this systemic shock to banking sector after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. Column (2) of Table 6 presents the results. The effect of equity capital on
VaR exceptions increases by almost three-fold for this quarter above the base effect. While
a standard deviation decrease in equity capital is associated with more than one additional
future exception outside of this period, the total effect is approximately 4.5 more exceptions
during 2008q4. Note that we are estimating the marginal effect of equity capital on VaR
exceptions during this quarter. Thus, any unconditional increase in volatilities of the under-
lying risk factors during the quarter is absorbed in the year-quarter fixed effect. The result
shows that the low-equity-capital banks breached their self-reported VaR levels considerably
more often during this quarter than their high-equity-capital counterparts.
While the Lehman Brother failure provides a clearly identifiable period of stress in the
market, a limitation of this measure is that it is based on just one quarter. To exploit time-
varying changes in the level of systemic risks, we obtain the MES for the banking sector as
a whole and divide all quarters into four groups based on this measure. Using the quarters
that fall in top quartile of the MES measure as systemically stressful quarters, we re-estimate
our model and present results in Columns (3) and (4).11 The effect of equity capital on VaR
exceptions is primarily concentrated in these quarters.
These results paint a clear picture: in addition to banks breaching their self-reported
11In robustness tests shown later, we use a continuous measure of MES along with alternative proxies of
financial stress in the economy and find similar results.
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VaR limits at a higher rate during periods when their level of capital is low, these effects
are most pronounced in periods of systemic stress in the economy. Thus, the reported risk
measures are least informative when accurate risk measurement is likely most important for
regulators and policy-makers to respond to severe financial shocks.
4.5 Bank Discretion and the Level of Reported Value-at-Risk
Banks have a lot of discretion in implementing their VaR model. The choice of overall
modeling technique (e.g., historical versus Monte Carlo simulation), the length of data period
for model calibration, risk factor volatilities and correlations are just a few assumptions that
can have substantial effects on banks’ estimate of their risk for reporting purposes (BIS,
2013). Without the knowledge of precise modeling assumptions and inputs used in the
model, we are limited in our ability to pin down the channels through which banks under-
report their risk. However, we provide some suggestive evidence in this section to shed light
on the channels of under-reporting.
Two crucial inputs for a bank’s VaR estimate are the level of exposure to a risk factor
undertaken by the bank and assumptions about the risk factor’s volatility. The assumption
on volatility is typically based on past one or two years’ historical data. Consider two
banks: one bank uses discretion in making assumptions about volatility parameters versus
another bank that follows a strict rule based on past realized volatility. All else equal, the
discretionary bank’s reported level of VaR should be less sensitive than the rule-based bank’s
VaR to publicly observed realized volatility measures. Further, if the discretionary bank is
using its discretion to get better estimate of its risk, then their VaR exceptions should be
lower than the rule-based bank. Based on these ideas, we estimate the sensitivity of reported
VaR to past macro-economic volatility measures across high and low capital banks. Using
past one year’s volatility in the returns to S&P 500 index (V ol) as a measure of aggregate
macro-economic volatility, we estimate the following model:
22
VaRi,t = φ(Equityit) + θ(Volt) + ρ(Equityit × Volt) + αi + ΓXit + it (3)
The dependent variable is the reported level of VaR at the beginning of quarter t. Volt
measures market volatility over the past year. We expect to find a positive coefficient on Volt
(i.e., higher volatility leads to higher value-at-risk). However, if banks use more discretion
in their VaR computation when they have low equity capital, we expect this the sensitivity
of VaR to volatility to be weaker for such banks. In such a case, ρˆ should be positive and
significant.
We estimate the regression model and report its results in Table 7. As shown in col-
umn (1), the past year’s market volatility significantly affects the reported VaR numbers.
However, the full specification in column (3) shows that this relationship is significantly dif-
ferent across banks with varying degree of equity capital. The coefficient of interest (ρˆ) is
positive and significant. This suggests that when banks have relatively lower equity capital,
the sensitivity of reported VaR to past market volatility is significantly lower. This find-
ing, along with our earlier results that such banks have higher exceptions in future quarters,
lends support to the hypothesis that banks are under-reporting their VaR by relying on their
discretion in choosing volatility measures. We repeat this exercise with the past two years’
volatility measures in columns (4)-(6) and find similar results.
4.6 Alternative Explanations & Robustness Tests
4.6.1 Stale Model
Our dependent variable is the number of exceptions with respect to self-reported VaR
number. An alternative interpretation of our results is that the under-reporting is not due
to incentive to save capital, but due to a poor-quality model that has not been updated. For
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example, during periods of high volatility in the market, the level of reported VaR is more
likely to be exceeded. In such quarters, historical risk measures used to estimate VaR is no
longer a good proxy for the realized volatility and correlations across asset classes during the
quarter. As a result, there are more exceptions. This effect, however, is likely to be present
for all banks, not only the ones with low equity capital. Thus, the year-quarter fixed effects
in our estimations alleviate this concern to a large extent. For the alternative explanation
to hold, it must be the case that models become relatively more inaccurate (for reasons
unrelated to incentives) only for the low-equity-capital banks during stressful periods such
as 2007-2008, and these inaccuracies persist over time. While this is unlikely, we perform
two additional tests to alleviate this concern.
Omitting Transition Periods:
VaR models are estimated on a daily basis at large financial institutions. They calibrate
their model to historical data and therefore use inputs on volatilities and correlations across
asset classes based on frequently updated historical data. When the economy transitions
from a relatively stable state to a stressful one, VaR models based on historical data are
likely to be inaccurate. However, as banks learn about the risks and correlations over time,
they update their models according to the new levels of risk.12 For example, in its 10-K
form Bank of America states, “As such, from time to time, we update the assumptions and
historical data underlying our VaR model. During the first quarter of 2008, we increased
the frequency with which we updated the historical data to a weekly basis. Previously, this
was updated on a quarterly basis.” Hence, the initial inaccuracy of the model after a shock
should have a short half-life.
In our sample, there is a large increase in the volatilities of the underlying risk measures
in 2007 as compared to historical averages. Based on the idea that banks can update their
model to reflect risk measures, we exclude the entire year of 2007 from our sample and re-
estimate the base model. If some banks simply have poor-quality models, this gives them
12BIS standards require that banks update their model at a minimum of once per quarter BIS (2005).
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an year to correct those models. We report the result from this test in Column (2) of Table
8. Our results remain similar in both qualitative and quantitative sense: banks have more
exceptions after low-equity quarters even after leaving out the transition year from a stable to
volatile period. In Column (3) of the Table, we leave out the quarter following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers (2008q4) and re-estimate the model. Again, our results are robust.
These results show that our findings are not completely driven by periods following extreme
changes in the market conditions.
Lagged Exceptions as a Proxy for a Poor-Quality, Stale Model:
In our next test, we include the lagged exceptions as an explanatory variable in the
model. The key idea is that if a bank experiences a number of exception during a quarter,
it has a relatively more inaccurate model for that quarter. Lagged exceptions is taken as a
crude proxy of the “stale model” for the next quarter. If some firms are just better than
the others in modelling their risk, then the inclusion of firm fixed effects in our base model
separates out such differences. However, if the quality of risk-model is time varying, then
the firm fixed effects might not be adequate to remove such effects. Specifically, if the
quality of risk models deteriorates precisely when a bank enters a low-capital quarter and
the poor quality of the bank’s model is persistent (i.e., not updated), then our inference can
be problematic. While such a time-varying difference in modelling skill seems unlikely, we
exploit the dynamics of panel data to further alleviate this concern.
If the modelling skill is time-varying and correlated with lower equity capital quarters
for a given bank, then our model takes the following form:
Exceptionsi,t+1 = β(Equityit) + αi + δt + ΓXit + it (4)
where
it = ModelQualityit + ηit (5)
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and
cov(Equityit, it) = cov(Equityit,ModelQualityit) 6= 0 (6)
If we can control for the time-varying nature of model quality in the above model and
if ηit are serially uncorrelated, we can consistently estimate the coefficient of interest (βˆ).
As argued above, a natural candidate for the time-varying model quality is the number of
exceptions in the past quarter. Hence we can rewrite our model as follows:
Exceptionsi,t+1 = β(Equityit) + αi + δt + ΓXit + θExceptionsi,t + ηit (7)
The inclusion of lagged dependent variable in a fixed effect model, however, results in
inconsistent estimates (Arellano and Bond (1991)). Hence, we estimate our model using the
GMM approach suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator first transforms
the equation using first-differences, and then uses lagged values of the dependent variable as
instruments to consistently estimate the model parameters.
We estimate the model with both first and second lag of quarterly exceptions as instru-
ments for lagged differences and present the results in columns (4) and (5) of Table (8). The
coefficient on equity ratio remains negative and both economically and statistically signifi-
cant for these specifications. We find a coefficient of -2.12 (p-value of 0.08) on log(Eq/AT)
in the model with one lag and -2.41 (p-value of 0.08) in the model with two lags as in-
struments. The Table also reports the p-values for Sargan test and a test for second order
autocorrelations in the residual term. Sargan test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the
over-identifying restrictions are valid. Similarly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero
second-order correlation in the residual term, thus supporting the necessary assumptions for
this estimation method.
The use of lagged exception as a proxy for the model quality is a strict specification for
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our empirical exercise. To the extent that lagged violations are also driven by incentives
to save capital, we are underestimating the true effect of capital in the model. Despite this
limitation, we find strong results. It is, therefore, unlikely that our results are driven by time
varying skills of the bank or the stale model problem.
4.6.2 Other Measures of Systemic Stress
In addition to Marginal Expected Shortfall, we use the Financial Stress Index (FSI)
developed by the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland, Kansas City, and St. Louis as measures
of stress in the banking sector. We estimate the effect of equity capital on VaR exceptions
across periods of varying levels of FSI. The results, along with estimates using a continuous
measure of MES, are provided in Table 9. Again, we find our main effect to be larger during
periods of high systemic stress.
4.6.3 Count Data Model
The number of exceptions is a count variable. We use fixed-effect linear regression mod-
els in the base case analyses since this specification allows us to consistently and efficiently
estimate the coefficients of interest. As a robustness exercise, we re-estimate our main re-
gressions using a count data model. These modelling approaches explicitly recognize the fact
that VaR exceptions only take non-negative integer values. Hence the dependent variable in
our regression model is discrete, and also skewed. However, the use of fixed effects in a non-
linear model suffers from the incidental parameter problem, which can result in inconsistent
estimates. With these caveats in mind, we re-estimate our models using two nonlinear spec-
ifications: a Poisson model and a negative Binomial model. Table 10 presents the results,
and shows that our main results do not change under the count model specifications.
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4.6.4 Business Mix of the Bank
Could our results be driven by different business mix of the banks? Some banks, for
example, engage more in risks related to interest rates or mortgages. To account for this
possibility, we create a measure of the bank’s trading risk based on the level of VaR reported
under different risk categories. We compute the fraction of trading VaR that comes from
different risk buckets as the ratio of VaR under the given category scaled by total VaR for
the quarter. Thus we have the fraction of trading VaR across interest rate, foreign exchange,
commodities, equity, and other. We include these variables in the base model as a control
for the business mix. Our results remain practically unchanged (unreported).
4.6.5 Expanded Sample
In our paper so far, we report our results based on 99% VaR measures of commercial
banks. As mentioned earlier, this allows us to be consistent across all observations. As a
robustness exercise, we repeat our main results by including VaR exceptions for the 95%
level. This allows us to expand our sample since some institutions, mainly broker-dealers,
only report VaR at 95% level in their quarterly disclosures. To be precise, the expanded
sample augments the base sample by including broker-dealers as well as commercial bank-
quarters that only have reports on 95% VaR. We have 545 observations for this sample.
For this regression analysis, we construct two measures of dependent variable. In the first
measure, called excess, we compare the actual exception to the statistical benchmark based
on the confidence level of VaR. If the exception exceeds the statistical benchmark, Excess
is set to one, otherwise zero. Thus Excess takes a value of one if the reported exception
in a quarter is greater than 0.6 for 99% VaR and greater than 3 for 95% VaR. The other
measure, 1(Exception), is simply an indicator variable that takes a value of one if there is at
least one exception during the quarter. In the regressions, we include an indicator variable
95pc CI that equals one for bank-quarter observations that are based on 95% VaR. Results
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are provided in Table 11. We find negative and significant coefficient on the equity capital
variable. Despite the limitations of mixing 95% and 99% VaR measures, our results remain
robust on the larger sample.
5 Conclusions
We show that banks are more likely to under-report their market risks when they have
lower equity capital. Regulators and investors rely on the bank’s self-reported risk measures
for a number of regulatory and investment decisions. Hence, the accuracy of these numbers
assume special importance, particularly when banks have lower levels of equity capital.
Our results show that when the incentive to save capital is strong, the self-reported risk
measures become inaccurate. Even more important, this behavior is strongest during periods
of high systemic stress. As a result, the integrity of these self-reported measures becomes
most questionable precisely when accurate risk measurement in the financial system is most
important.
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Figure 1: Average Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This figure presents the average frequency of Value-at-Risk (VaR) exceptions for banks each quarter
during the 2002-2012 sample period. The dashed line at 0.63 represents the expected exception
frequency based on at 99% VaR confidence interval and approximately 63 trading days per quarter.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This figure presents the distribution of observed quarterly VaR exceptions (shaded) along with the
corresponding expected distribution based on the binomial nature of VaR Exceptions. The inset
figure presents observations with at least two VaR exceptions on a different scale for readability.
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Table 1: Base Sample Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. These sample statistics are for the base sample of
commercial banks reporting 99% Value-at-Risk during 2002-2012. Table 2 provides details of the specific
banks in the sample. Exceptions is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported
Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, Value-at-Risk is the reported level of future loss that should not be
exceeded at the 99% confidence level, and VaR-[Trading Desk] variables are the reported value-at-risk for
the various trading desks (interest rate, foreign exchange, equities, and commodities) with Diversification
Benefit representing the claimed reduction in VaR due to less than perfect correlation across trading desks.
Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max N
Bank Characteristics:
Total Assets ($Bn) 901.40 767.93 73.14 291.14 602.46 1428.16 3643.58 424
NI-to-Assets (%,Q) 0.17 0.20 -1.16 0.09 0.18 0.25 1.57 424
BookEq/AT (%) 6.32 3.15 1.69 4.06 5.14 9.01 13.84 424
log(Eq/AT) -2.89 0.51 -4.08 -3.20 -2.97 -2.41 -1.98 424
Value-at-Risk ($MM):
Exceptions 0.62 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.00 424
Total Value-at-Risk 61.90 85.86 3.60 9.00 26.00 75.00 433.00 422
VaR-Interest Rate 46.42 73.39 0.00 4.40 15.28 60.80 430.58 422
VaR-Foreign Exchange 9.09 12.44 0.00 0.89 2.69 15.70 62.82 422
VaR-Equities 20.87 31.39 0.00 3.14 7.64 27.12 204.60 422
VaR-Commodities 7.49 10.80 0.00 0.29 2.08 10.50 52.31 422
VaR-Other 17.23 49.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.65 322.88 422
VaR-Diversification Benefit 40.89 54.01 0.00 4.86 11.70 59.60 241.67 422
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Table 2: Sample Composition and Value-at-Risk Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents statistics for the “Base Sample,”
which comprises commercial banks reporting 99% Confidence Interval Value-at-Risk (VaR) during 2002-
2012. Panel B presents statistics for observations that are added to form the “Expanded Sample,” which also
includes commercial bank observations reporting 95% VaR and observations from broker/dealers. Exceptions
is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next
quarter, Value-at-Risk is the reported level of future loss that should not be exceeded at the defined confidence
level (99% or 95%).
Panel A: Base Sample
Exceptions (99% CI) Value-at-Risk
Bank Mean Min Max Mean Min Max N
Bank of America Corporation 0.45 0.00 10.00 93.75 32.50 275.80 44
Bank of Montreal 0.73 0.00 5.00 25.00 11.00 46.00 33
Bank of New York Mellon 0.07 0.00 2.00 7.48 3.90 13.40 44
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 0.14 0.00 3.00 8.67 3.60 18.70 44
Citi Group 0.22 0.00 1.00 167.22 109.00 224.00 9
Credit Suisse Group 1.39 0.00 11.00 119.18 44.00 243.00 28
Deutsche Bank 1.50 0.00 13.00 88.63 55.10 142.90 32
ING Group 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.62 11.80 39.00 13
JPMorgan Chase 0.38 0.00 5.00 113.34 53.70 289.00 32
PNC 0.44 0.00 5.00 7.39 4.70 11.70 27
Royal Bank of Canada 0.75 0.00 4.00 36.25 18.00 60.00 28
Scotia Bank 0.10 0.00 1.00 13.12 6.80 29.30 42
SunTrust Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.40 4.00 28.00 17
UniCredit Group 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.43 28.80 39.80 3
UBS 2.61 0.00 13.00 244.68 24.00 433.00 28
Panel B: Additional Observations for Expanded Sample
99% CI 95% CI
Exceptions Exceptions
Bank Mean Max VaR N Mean Max VaR N
Goldman Sachs – – – 0 0.80 6.00 118.79 40
JPMorgan Chase – – – 0 0.50 3.00 70.75 12
Lehman Brothers 4.50 9.00 126.50 2 0.33 3.00 45.09 15
Morgan Stanley 0.00 0.00 66.50 18 1.38 13.00 102.16 26
PNC – – – 0 0.25 1.00 3.77 8
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Table 3: Equity Ratio and Future Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times
the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/AT) is
the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, Total Assets is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio
of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign
Exchange, and Interest Rate indices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions
log(Eq/AT) -2.70∗∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗ -3.04∗∗∗ -2.56∗∗∗ -2.56∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Total Assets 1.04 1.00 0.69∗∗ 1.01 1.01∗∗
(0.14) (0.16) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04)
NI-to-Assets -0.36 -0.23 -0.53 -0.53
(0.74) (0.81) (0.57) (0.65)
Vol-Commodities 1.09∗∗ 0.69 0.69
(0.03) (0.45) (0.11)
Vol-S&P 500 1.00∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗ 1.20∗∗
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.12 0.90 0.90
(0.85) (0.42) (0.23)
Vol-Interest Rate 0.95∗∗ 0.54 0.54
(0.02) (0.70) (0.38)
Year-Quarter (Y-Q) FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 424 424 424 424 424 424
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.47 0.47
SE Clustered by Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Bank
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Equity Ratio, Recent Returns, and Future Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times
the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/AT) is
the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, LowRet is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the prior quarter’s
return is in the lower quartile, Total Assets is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly
net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and
Interest Rate indices. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions
log(Eq/AT) -2.56∗∗∗ -2.52∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
LowRet 0.50 0.47 -3.82∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.04)
log(Eq/AT) * LowRet -1.48∗∗
(0.03)
Total Assets 1.01 1.34∗ 1.00 1.27∗∗
(0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.04)
NI-to-Assets -0.53 -0.32 -0.33 -0.19
(0.57) (0.73) (0.71) (0.82)
Vol-Commodities 0.69 0.50 0.70 0.74
(0.45) (0.56) (0.41) (0.32)
Vol-S&P 500 1.20∗∗ 1.11∗∗ 1.14∗∗ 1.09∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.90 0.79 0.91 0.88
(0.42) (0.48) (0.41) (0.38)
Vol-Interest Rate 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.47
(0.70) (0.69) (0.71) (0.74)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 424 424 424 424
R2 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Future Exceptions when VaR is a larger portion of Equity Capital
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times
the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/AT)
is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, VE 2006 is the ratio percentage of Value-at-Risk to Equity
( V aREquity ∗ 100) at the beginning of 2006, High(VE 2006) is an indicator equal to 1 for observations where
VE 2006 is above the sample median, Total Assets is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio
of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign
Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. With VE 2006 measured as of 2006, all observations prior to 2006 are
dropped from this subsample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions
log(Eq/AT) -3.58∗∗ -0.86 -0.86 1.35 1.35
(0.01) (0.57) (0.55) (0.45) (0.36)
VE 2006 * log(Eq/AT) -5.54∗∗ -5.54∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.00)
High(VE 2006) * log(Eq/AT) -7.45∗∗ -7.45∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.00)
Total Assets 0.62 -0.20 -0.20 -0.16 -0.16
(0.46) (0.80) (0.81) (0.85) (0.83)
NI-to-Assets -0.65 0.06 0.06 -0.15 -0.15
(0.58) (0.95) (0.96) (0.90) (0.90)
Vol-Commodities 0.77 0.86 0.86∗ 0.48 0.48
(0.53) (0.44) (0.08) (0.70) (0.39)
Vol-S&P 500 1.20∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 1.27∗∗ 1.27∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.95
(0.49) (0.49) (0.27) (0.50) (0.25)
Vol-Interest Rate 0.59 1.02 1.02 0.86 0.86
(0.73) (0.50) (0.14) (0.62) (0.13)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 330 330 330 330 330
R2 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51
SE Clustered by Y-Q Y-Q Bank Y-Q Bank
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Equity Ratio and Future Value-at-Risk Exceptions during Stress
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times
the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/AT) is
the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, 2008q4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the quarter following
Lehman Brothers’ collapse, HiMES is an indicator variable equal to 1 for quarter when the Marginal Expected
Shortfall of the financial sector is in the top quartile for the sample, Total Assets is the log of total assets, NI-
to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity,
S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions
log(Eq/AT) -2.56∗∗∗ -2.22∗∗ -2.55∗∗∗ -1.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18)
log(Eq/AT) * 2008q4 -6.78∗∗∗
(0.00)
HiMES 0.44 -4.33∗
(0.56) (0.09)
log(Eq/AT) * HiMES -1.64∗∗
(0.04)
Total Assets 1.01 1.15∗ 1.02 1.07∗
(0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09)
NI-to-Assets -0.53 -0.79 -0.48 -0.30
(0.57) (0.40) (0.60) (0.73)
Vol-Commodities 0.69 0.62 0.78 0.88
(0.45) (0.50) (0.39) (0.35)
Vol-S&P 500 1.20∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 1.04∗ 0.94∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.09)
Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.90 1.03 0.82 0.78
(0.42) (0.40) (0.47) (0.50)
Vol-Interest Rate 0.54 0.58 0.76 0.64
(0.70) (0.68) (0.60) (0.67)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 424 424 424 424
R2 0.47 0.56 0.48 0.51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Explaining the Level of Reported VaR
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of log(Value-at-Risk) on banks’ equity capital ratio
log(Eq/AT), past stock market volatility, and a vector of control variables. log(Eq/AT) is the log of the book
equity-to-assets ratio, L.log([t]yr S&P vol) is the log of the annualized volatility of daily S&P500 returns
over the past t years, Total Assets is the log of total assets. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(VaR) log(VaR) log(VaR) log(VaR) log(VaR) log(VaR)
L.log(1yr S&P vol) 0.26∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
log(Eq/AT) -0.84∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Total Assets 0.62∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Eq/AT) × L.log(1yr S&P vol) 0.20∗∗
(0.01)
L.log(2yr S&P vol) 0.16∗ 0.07 0.75∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.26) (0.00)
log(Eq/AT) × L.log(2yr S&P vol) 0.23∗∗∗
(0.00)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 405 405 405 405 405 405
R2 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.88 0.89
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Stale Model – Omitting Periods and Arellano-Bond Estimates
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter
on banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. Column (1) is the baseline
specification for comparision. Columns (2) and (3) present estimates omitting observations in 2007 and
2008q4, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) present estimates of panel estimates using Arellano-Bond (1991)
estimation with one and two lags, respectively. Exceptions is the number of times the bank had losses
that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/AT) is the log of the book
equity-to-assets ratio, 2008q4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the quarter following Lehman Brothers’
collapse, HiMES is an indicator variable equal to 1 for quarter when the Marginal Expected Shortfall of the
financial sector is in the top quartile for the sample, Total Assets is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is
the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500,
Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All drop2007 drop2008q4 AB1lag AB2lags
log(Eq/AT) -2.56∗∗∗ -2.52∗∗ -2.27∗∗ -2.12∗ -2.41∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08)
L.Exceptions 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
L2.Exceptions -0.01
(0.92)
Total Assets 1.01 0.80 1.16∗ 1.75∗∗ 1.70∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02)
NI-to-Assets -0.53 -0.74 -0.67 1.21∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.44) (0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Vol-Commodities 0.69 0.85 0.88 0.97∗ 1.01
(0.45) (0.37) (0.30) (0.05) (0.25)
Vol-S&P 500 1.20∗∗ 0.98∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.90 0.80 0.10 0.53 0.46
(0.42) (0.46) (0.89) (0.45) (0.58)
Vol-Interest Rate 0.54 -0.41 0.42 1.74∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.63) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 424 379 413 392 378
R2 0.47 0.48 0.47
2nd Order AR Test p-val 0.91 0.99
Sargan Test p-val 0.42 0.48
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Alternative Measures of Financial Stress
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times
the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/AT)
is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, log(MES) is log of the Marginal Expected Shortfall of the
financial sector, Cleveland FSI is Financial Stress Index computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
KansasCity FSI is Financial Stress Index computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, StLouis
FSI is Financial Stress Index computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Total Assets is the log of
total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities
of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. Standard errors are clustered by
year-quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions
log(Eq/AT) -2.56∗∗∗ 20.81∗∗∗ -1.11 -0.76 -1.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.35) (0.28)
log(MES) -2.58
(0.29)
log(Eq/AT) × log(MES) -1.68∗∗∗
(0.00)
Cleveland FSI -1.90∗
(0.05)
log(Eq/AT) × Cleveland FSI -0.86∗∗
(0.01)
KansasCity FSI -1.67
(0.35)
log(Eq/AT) × KansasCity FSI -0.76∗
(0.06)
StLouis FSI -0.80
(0.48)
log(Eq/AT) × StLouis FSI -0.76∗
(0.05)
Total Assets 1.01 1.83∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
NI-to-Assets -0.53 -0.73 -0.45 -0.53 -0.48
(0.57) (0.40) (0.59) (0.58) (0.63)
Vol-Commodities 0.69 1.07 0.96 0.77 0.94
(0.45) (0.23) (0.28) (0.40) (0.28)
Vol-S&P 500 1.20∗∗ 0.66 0.38 0.53 0.20
(0.02) (0.27) (0.53) (0.42) (0.65)
Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.90 0.91 0.82 1.18 -0.27
(0.42) (0.44) (0.41) (0.28) (0.75)
Vol-Interest Rate 0.54 0.68 0.32 0.51 0.06
(0.70) (0.62) (0.81) (0.70) (0.96)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 424 424 424 424 424
R2 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.57
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Equity Ratio and Future Violations – Non-linear models
This table presents count model regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on banks’
equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. Columns (1) and (2) present estimates from
a negative binomial regression model, and columns (3) and (4) present estimates from a poisson regression
model Exceptions is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk
during the next quarter, log(Eq/AT) is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, Total Assets is the log of
total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities
of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions Exceptions
log(Eq/AT) -1.22∗ -1.55∗ -1.14∗ -2.12∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.00)
Total Assets -0.79 -0.86
(0.26) (0.14)
NI-to-Assets 0.16 0.23
(0.83) (0.70)
Vol-Commodities -0.61 -0.59
(0.56) (0.48)
Vol-S&P 500 2.41∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Vol-Foreign Exchange -1.02 -0.63
(0.49) (0.62)
Vol-Interest Rate -0.60 -0.73
(0.55) (0.35)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 391 391 391 391
log likelihood -210.42 -197.84 -223.83 -207.22
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Expanded Sample Tests
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of measures of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/AT) and a vector of control variables. These test include the base sample
observations (commercial banks reporting 99% VaR) and expanded sample observations (broker/dealers
and reports of 95% VaR). Exceptions is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-
reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter with 1(Exception) an indicator equal to 1 if the bank has
at least 1 exception, Excess is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a bank’s number of exceptions exceeds
their expected number of exceptions based on the confidence level (i.e., Exceptions ≥ 0.6 for 99% CI and
Exceptions ≥ 3.0 for 95% CI), 95pc CI is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a bank reports VaR at the
95% level, log(Eq/AT) is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, Total Assets is the log of total assets, NI-
to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity,
S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excess Excess Excess 1(Exception) 1(Exception) 1(Exception)
log(Eq/AT) -0.20∗ -0.17∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.23∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
95pc CI 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(0.72) (0.67) (0.64) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Total Assets -0.07 0.09∗ -0.07 -0.07 0.12∗∗ -0.07
(0.48) (0.09) (0.46) (0.52) (0.04) (0.49)
NI-to-Assets 0.14 -0.03 0.07 0.09 -0.09 0.03
(0.29) (0.80) (0.54) (0.53) (0.42) (0.84)
Vol-Commodities 0.24∗∗∗ 0.02 0.24∗∗ 0.04
(0.01) (0.88) (0.01) (0.79)
Vol-S&P 500 0.25∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Vol-Foreign Exchange -0.08 -0.23 -0.14 -0.17
(0.58) (0.19) (0.39) (0.34)
Vol-Interest Rate 0.07 -0.15 0.11 -0.12
(0.38) (0.36) (0.23) (0.45)
Year-Quarter FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Bank FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 545 545 545 545 545 545
R2 0.44 0.38 0.49 0.45 0.38 0.49
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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